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The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of
Economic Loss in American Products
Liability
Baz Edmeades*
Due mainly to the ill-founded conclusions of Dean Prosser, American products
liability law has usually denied recovery of economic loss caused by defective prod-
ucts to parties not in contractual privity. Through an outline of the historical ori-
gins of implied warranty, the author argues that manufacturers and sellers of de-
fective products should be liable for economic loss. Implied warranty provides the
logical vehicle for such recovery, and representational theory provides the theoreti-
cal basis.
T HEDISPATCH THREW EVERYONE into a state of confusion.
GREATER PART OF CITADEL UNHARMED STOP ENEMY MORALE HIGH
STOP SECRET AGENTS SUSPECTED OF HAVING INFILTRATED OUR
FORCES
Why the consternation? The last centuries of the dying planet had after
all been so consistently violent and disturbed that news from one or another
battlefront seldom produced surprise anymore.
If the truth be told, the dispatch caused a stir only because nobody knew
whether to believe it or not: no less respected and prestigious a correspon-
dent than William Prosser had chronicled the assault upon the citadel of
* B.A. (1965), LL.B. (1969), University of the Witwatersrand; LL.M.(1974), Institute of
Comparative Law of McGill University. The author is an Assistant Professor of Law at
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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privityI and the citadel's fall in great detail some years before. 2 So intimate
was Prosser's acquaintance with the events in question that his word could
scarcely be doubted. Like George Orwell in Spain, Prosser had been both
historian of and soldier in the struggle.
Representatives of the media were accordingly ordered to the site to
ascertain the truth. First reports indicated that the biggest part of the
citadel-the economic loss section--did indeed remain in the hands of the
enemy.
There is no question that part of the citadel has fallen. Presently, all
states allow a buyer who lacks privity of contract with a manufacturer to
recover for personal injuries caused by the manufacturer's negligence. 3 Vir-
tually every state has on occasion imposed strict liability upon a manufac-
turer whose defective product has caused an out-of-privity buyer to sustain
personal injuries. 4 Many states have allowed nonprivity buyers recovery
against manufacturers for property damage caused by a defective product. 5
Contrary to Prosser's triumphant report, however, there is no question
that the greater part of the citadel of privity in products liability cases re-
mains intact. With some exceptions, 6 litigants alleging economic loss, instead
of personal injury or property damage, are still without any remedy when
they lack privity of contract with the defendant. 7
A dreadful charge was made to explain the survival of the citadel: Prosser
was a secret agent serving its defenders! 8 In 1960,9 his accusers argued,
1. Judge Cardozo first analogized the judical concept of "privity" to a mighty citadel in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
2. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Fall].
3. E.g., Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942); Simmons Co. v. Hardin,
75 Ga. App. 420, 43 S.E.2d 553 (1947); Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693
(1964); Comment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An
Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145, 145-46 (1972).
4. E.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970);
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Ulmer v. Ford Motor
Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
5. E.g., Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Burrnus Feed
Mills, Inc. v. Reeder, 391 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
6. Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Continental
Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970);
Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
7. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Price v. Catlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
8. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
9. The Assault, supra note 2.
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Prosser enthusiastically welcomed the appearance of what he called "seven
spectacular decisions" 10 which expanded the strict liability of the food and
drink area to the manufacturers of other kinds of defective goods.1 1 But look
(their argument ran) at the seven decisions-no less than four of them were
economic loss awards! 12 They were part of a broad frontal attack on the
whole citadel including its economic loss wing, but Prosser had chosen to
report that the fighting had only involved "dangerous" products causing "in-
jury."' 3 Later, emboldened by the success of this deception, he completed
his undercover mission for the defenders of the citadel by openly advocating
that there should be no liability to the out-of-privity plaintiff for products
which only caused him economic loss.14
So goes the scenario of the battle to date. In using overstatement against
the late William Prosser, it is difficult to equal his own beautiful and imag-
inative use of that weapon. Nevertheless, the arguments favoring compen-
sation of economic loss are persuasive even without overstatement.
This article presents a revisionist point of view of the extension of the
concept of implied warranty of merchantability beyond the confines of priv-
ity of contract in the food and drink category, and thence to all defective
products causing economic loss and other types of injury. The article begins
with an attempt to define the concept of economic loss. Following this defi-
nition is a historical outline of the concept of implied warranty and its rela-
tionship to the economic loss problem. The final portion deals with the un-
resolved question of whether there should be any liability for economic loss
between parties who are not in privity of contract. A representational theory
suggests a resolution of this issue.
Implied warranty evolved as a mercantile remedy for the recovery of eco-
nomic loss almost 100 years before the first case allowing economic loss re-
covery to an out-of-privity plaintiff was decided.' 5 Although the court in that
first case was clearly making new law in accepting the invitation of the plain-
10. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Hinton v. Republic
Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261
(Cal, App. 1959), opinion vacated and affd in part and rev'd in part, 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d
575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius,
Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99
N.W.2d 670 (1959); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959).
11. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1112.
12. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Jarnot v.
Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959).
13. See The Assault, supra note 2, at 1112.
14. See The Fall, supra note 2, at 820-23.
15. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). See notes 77-83 infra and
accompanying text.
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tiff's attorney to find liability in implied warranty in the absence of privity, it
was able to do so by shifting the focus of an existing body of rules from sales
law to an area that would today be called products liability. These rules
impose strict liability for all categories of loss caused by the supply of defec-
tive products including physical damage to chattels and personal injury. In
the latter respect they transcend the scope of the aedilitian sales remedies of
the civil law, performing what civilians would probably think of as a delictual
or tortious function while retaining the benefits of their contractual anteced-
ents.16 In his desire to promote the "new"V strict liability in tort, Prosser has
,obscured the historical importance of implied warranty and with it economic
loss recovery in products liability cases.
Prosser's suggestion that the out-of-privity warranty cases be rationalized
as a modified form of tort liability is not necessarily a bad one, but his own
brainchild, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is no more
than a truncated restatement of the effect of these cases since it excludes
liability for economic loss and retreats from the strictness of warranty liabil-
ity.17 The preference for implied warranty over tort as a doctrinal vehicle
for products liability shown by a number of American courts need not be
seen as an anomaly. Far from being "pernicious and unnecessary," 18 this
adaptation of implied warranty is in fact an apposite illustration of the readi-
ness of the common law to subordinate the superficial demands of concep-
tual neatness to the deeper rationality of utility.' 9
I. CLASSIFICATION OF DAMAGES
While the term "economic loss" evades simple definition, 20 this discus-
sion requires a basic understanding of its meaning. In privity of contract, the
buyer of defective goods is permitted by the common law to claim the dif-
ference between the actual value of the goods when delivered to him and
the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty. For
purposes of this discussion, this prima facie measure of damages will be
referred to as "direct" damages.
Beyond direct damages, the buyer may also suffer various kinds of con-
16. Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law: A Comparative
Study (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 262, 274 (1964).
17. Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the Judge's Movement Be
Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974); see text accompanying notes 89-95
infra.
18. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1134.
19. See F. LAWSON, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW 11-14 (1951).
20. Economic loss is commonly mislabeled. See Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42
Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975); Note, Recovery of Direct Economic Loss: Unanswered
Questions of Ohio Products Liability Law, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 683 (1977) (demonstrating
the mislalheling of economic loss damages in Iacono as property damage).
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sequential losses which may be classified as physical harm, including per-
sonal injury and property damage, and economic loss. Personal injury pre-
sents no special problems of classification, but the dividing line between
property damage and economic loss is blurred. For example, does a defec-
tive floor preparation which transfers its powerful obnoxious odor to mer-
chandise in a store where it has been applied cause property damage or
economic loss? 2 1
Property damage can be conceptualized as the physical injury sustained
by an object, including a defective product itself, as a result of an accident
caused by the product.2 2 Economic loss may be viewed as not merely the
appendage of a risk or occurrence of personal or property damage,23 but as
loss in product value (direct economic loss) and loss stemming indirectly
from that loss of product value, such as loss of goodwill or anticipated profits
(consequential economic loss).24 Damage to the defective chattel itself is
often regarded as an exclusively economic loss, 2 5 but American courts have
long been prepared to award out-of-privity property damages to a buyer
21. See Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971).
22. See Zammit, Manufacturers' Responsibility for Economic Loss Damages in Products
Liability Cases: What Result in New York?, 20 N.Y.L.F. 81, 82 (1974); Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 919-20 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Products Liability Jurisprudence].
Physical injury befalling a defective product itself has occasionally been regarded as
economic loss. E.g., Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 981 (1966). Less confusion seems to be engen-
dered, however, when physical damage to any object, including a defective product, is thought
of as property damage. Buyers lacking privity of contract with a product's manufacturer have
found many American courts quite hospitable to claims of physical injury to a defective product
itself. This has been true despite the generally recognized immunity from liability for economic
loss. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953); Spencer v.
Madsen, 142 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1944); C.D. Herne, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534
(Ky. 1956). Thus, economic loss and property damage appear to be suitably distinguished on the
basis of physical damage-such damage to a defective product itself being classified as property
damage and not economic loss.
23. Some commentators suggest that since the only kind of readily recoverable economic
loss is the result of an unreasonable risk of harm to persons or tangible property, economic loss
ought to be legally defined as economic injury stemming from this risk of harm to persons and
property. See Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 929-31, 935-36, 950-51.
24. See id. at 918. See also Franklin, supra note 22, at 980-81. A helpful example which
adequately displays the differences between "economic loss" and "property damage" appears in
Zammit, supra note 22, at 82:
[A] truck's defective brakes may give rise to either economic loss or property dam-
age, depending upon the facts. If the defect is discovered and the truck is thereby
rendered temporarily unusable, its owner may suffer economic damage consisting of
the costs of repairing the brakes, as well as consequential "economic loss" of profits
resulting from his inability to use the truck in his business. On the other hand, if
the defect is not discovered and an accident with another vehicle occurs, the dam-
age both to the truck and the other vehicle resulting from the impact constitutes
property damage.
25. Franklin, supra note 22, at 978-79.
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whose chattel self-destructs in a suitably dramatic manner. An automobile
which catches fire because of an electrical fault has sustained "physical"
damage, while another which oxidizes at a more sedate pace by rusting
causes "mere" economic loss to its buyer.26
Because all the categories of loss are recoverable in implied warranty,
these distinctions do not have controlling. importance either in cases where
the plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract with each other, or in
one of the American jurisdictions where liability in implied warranty is not
dependent upon privity of contract. They make all the difference, however,
in jurisdictions where the only out-of-privity remedy is a tortious one, since
many courts are still opposed to tort liability for economic loss caused by
defective products. 27 Physical damage caused by defective chattels has been
actionable in tort for some time, but economic loss claims have been denied
in some cases even where the defect in question threatens physical harm or
personal injury in addition to rendering the chattel unusable.2 8
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF IMPLIED
WARRANTY: FROM COMMON LAW ORIGINS TO MODERN
STATUTORY CODIFICATION
Breach of warranty of the soundness of goods was actionable at common
law by the end of the 14th century. The form of action was trespass "in the
manner of deceit." 29 Although the writs commonly stated that the plaintiff
had been "craftilly and subtilly" deceived by the defendant, the plaintiff was
not required to prove that the defendant knew of the defect.3 0 It is often
said that liability for breach of warranty was tortious at this stage, but "[t]he
affinity between the obligation incurred by the making of a false representa-
tion (the most important form of deceit) and the obligation which arises out
of the making of a promise is so marked that some scholars refuse to take
any account whatever of false representation as a species of tort."31
By the end of the 18th century, considerations of procedural convenience
moved lawyers to use assumpsit as the form of action for breach of war-
ranty. 32 Soon afterward a growing number of judges began to find warran-
ties of quality implicit in the circumstances of a sale in the absence of any
express undertaking by the seller. At an early stage of this development it
became apparent that some of these judges were more concerned with the
26. Id. at 981.
27. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
28. E.g., TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd
mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 155 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956).
29. Garrok v. Heytesbery, Y.B. Trin. 11 Rich. 2, pl. 2 (1387).
30. Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1791).
31. T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEcAL LIABILITY 374 (1906).
32. Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
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implementation of certain policy interests than with the parties' express in-
tentions. "[I]n every contract to furnish manufactured goods, however low
the price," wrote Chief Justice Best in 1825, "it is an implied term, that the
goods must be merchantable .... [I]t will teach manufacturers that they
should not aim at underselling each other by producing goods of inferior
quality." 33 The implied warranty of merchantability began, therefore, to as-
sume the quality of an ex lege obligation after it had migrated from the writ
of deceit to assumpsit.
A number of 19th century judges refused to accept these departures from
the caveat emptor rule, and a host of qualifications and distinctions sprang
up around the implied warranty cases. In Jones v. Just 34 all these judicial
maneuvers were woven into a long and essentially meaningless explanation
of the circumstances in which implied warranty arose. Sir McKenzie Chal-
mers drew upon this formulation in drafting sections 14 (1) and (2) of the
English Sale of Goods Act in 1893-an ambiguous statutory statement of the
implied warranties of quality-which was reproduced almost verbatim in
sections 15 (1) and (2) of the Uniform Sales Act that was recommended for
enactment to the several states by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1906.35
The statutory formulation of the warranties left a number of questions of
considerable legal and social significance unanswered. Were the warranties
applicable, for instance, to the typical over-th-counter retail sale? Soon
after the turn of the 20th century, British courts had, answered this question
in the affirmative, 36 while a large number of American courts, until fairly
33. Jones v. Bright, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1173 (C.P. 1825).
34. [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 197.
35. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES 1-2 (rev. ed. 1948). The relevant text of the Uniform Sales Act
is as follows:
See. 15. IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF QUALITY. Subject to the provisions of this act
and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to
sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the sellers skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer
or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards
defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent
or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular
purpose.
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15 (act withdrawn 1951).
36. P. A=AH, THE SALE OF GOODS 55-83 (3d ed. 1966). These English decisions gave a
restrictive interpretation to the statutory language which could well have been construed to
19771
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
recently, interpreted the same language as preserving the immunity of retail
sellers. The adaptation of this mercantile remedy to the needs of consumers
meant that the British courts soon found themselves using implied warranty
as a remedy for personal injury. One of the first personal injury cases con-
cerned poisonous food and drink. An ancient warranty of wholesomeness
long antedating the modem chain of mercantile cases arising from Gardiner
v. Gray3 7 in 1815 was invoked to justify this development. 38 American
'courts resurrected this warranty of wholesomeness early in the 19th century.
It enjoyed an independent existence as an exceptional form of retail liability
for a considerable period of time before being amalgamated into the general
rule of retail responsibility for defective goods now contained in section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
III. THE RECEPTION AND ADAPTATION OF
IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
To describe the development of the warranties of quality in particular
states of the Union or to isolate specific lines of cases would inflate and
fragment this study to an impossible degree.3 9 There are, however, nation-
wide trends discernable with sufficient clarity in the cases and literature to
permit meaningful discussion of warranties of quality in the United States at
a generalized level.
A. Manufacturing vs. Nonmanufacturing Seller
Where the seller was the manufacturer or grower of the goods, the laws
of the great majority of the states implied a condition into the contract that
the goods were to be of merchantable quality.40 This remained true until
the nationwide acceptance of retail responsibility for defective merchandise
clothe retail sellers with immunity. See, e.g., Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors,
Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 831; Wren v. Holt, [1903] 1 K.B. 610.
37. 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (N.P. 1815).
38. Wallis v. Russell, [1902] 2 Ir. R. 585 (K.B. 1901).
39. Llewellyn, in his two part On Warranty of Quality, and Society, Part 1, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 699 (1936); Part 11, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341 (1937), generally restricts his discussion of
"Quality Obligation in the United States" to a discussion of the doctrinal developments in New
York and Pennsylvania, commenting that legal and social conditions "varied from state to state,
district to district, decade to decade, to a degree impossible in the mother-country." 36
COLUM. L. REv. at 732.
40. E.g., Carleton v. Lombard, Ayers & Co., 149 N.Y. 137, 43 N.E. 422 (1896); Hoe v.
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860); see Baer & Co. v. Mobile Cooperage & Box Mfg. Co., 159 Ala.
491, 49 So. 92 (1909); Dollins Sign & Advertising Co. v. Smith, 187 Ark. 1162, 62 S.W.2d 978
(1933); F. Sage & Co. v. Alexander & Ouiatt Corp., 138 Cal. App. 476, 32 P.2d 655 (1934);
Indestructible Wheel Co. v. Red Ball Body Corp., 100 Ind. App. 150, 194 N.E. 738 (1935);
London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d 766 (1929). See also
K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 340 (1930); S. WILLISTON,
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during the 1940's and 1950's swamped this exceptional form of liability. The
frequently repeated rationale for this rule was that a buyer would necessarily
rely on the manufacturing seller. No one doubted the fairness of imputing
knowledge of any defects in the goods to one so intimately acquainted with
them as their maker. 41 This attitude, moreover, had respectable origins in
Great Britain. Laing v. Fidgeon,42 decided at Nisi Prius four weeks after
Gardiner v. Gray 3 (the wellspring of the merchantability decisions), held
that every contract for manufactured goods included an implied term that
the goods were merchantable."4 When counsel for the seller confronted
Chief Justice Best in Jones v. Bright 45 with Chandelor v. Lopus4 6 and
Parkinson v. Lee 47-- the mainstays of caveat emptor-the learned Chief Jus-
tice responded with this distinction:
Tlhere is a great difference between contracts for horses and a
warranty of a manufactured article. No prudence can guard against
latent defects in a horse; but by providing proper materials, a mer-
chant may guard against defects in manufactured articles; as he
who manufactures copper may, by due care, prevent the introduc-
tion of too much oxygen.4 8
True, this was liability for manufactured articles (whoever sold them)
rather than the narrower manufacturing seller's liability which evolved in the
United States. But the idea that manufacturer's responsibility for defective
merchandise was greater than that of a mere dealer was a recurrent theme
SAI-s § 232, at 592 (3d ed. 1948); Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His
Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1938); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 117, 146 (1943); Waite, Retail Responsibility and
Judicial Law Making, 34 MicH. L. REv. 494, 503 (1936).
41. This presumption [that the seller knows of the defect] is justified, in part, by
the fact that the manufacturer or maker by his occupation holds himself out as compe-
tent to make articles reasonably adapted to the purpose for which such or similar articles
are designed. When, therefore, the buyer has no opportunity to inspect the article, or
when, from the situation, inspection is impracticable or useless, it is unreasonable to
suppose that he brought on his own judgment, or that he did not rely on the judgment
of the seller as to latent defects of which the latter, if he used due care, must have been
informed during the process of manufacture. If the buyer relied, and under the cir-
cumstances had reason to rely, on the judgment of the seller, who was the manufacturer
or maker of the article, the law implies a warranty that it is reasonably fit for the use for
which it was designed, the seller at the time being informed of the purpose to devote it
to that use.
Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1884).
42. 171 Eng. Rep. 55 (N.P. 1815).
43. 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (N.P. 1815).
44. Laing v. Fidgeon, 171 Eng. Rep. 55 (N.P. 1815).
45. 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
46. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1791).
47. 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802).
48. 130 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1172 (C.P. 1829).
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in English case law4 9 until Chalmers drafted the emphatic phrase "whether
he be the manufacturer or not" into both section 14 (1) and (2) of the Sale of
Goods Act. 50
While a manufacturing seller therefore received much the same treat-
ment under English and American law, the position of the "mere dealer"
was much more favorable in the United States. "A manufacturer knows, or
ought to know, the design, materials, and workmanship of the machines he
produces, while a trader in them, who has no connection with their man-
ufacture, is chargeable with no such knowledge." 51
In 1906 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended the
Uniform Sales Act for enactment by the states. Sections 15 (1) and (2) of the
Act were almost exact replicas of sections 14 (1) and (2) of the English Sale
of Goods Act. Although its gradual adoption by the states over the next fifty
years coincided with the decline of dealer immunity in the United States,
the immediate effect of the Uniform Sales Act was not decisive. American
courts showed little desire to participate in the radical surgery which was
performed on these sections by the British courts to excise the various pro-
visos that rendered dealer responsibility so illusive and uncertain. Instead, a
number of states preserved their notions of retail immunity by utilizing one
or more of the conditions which characterized these guarded provisions.
There was also considerable debate about how much real reliance a buyer
could place on the skill and judgment of a retailer.5 2 As recently as the
1950's a diminishing, but articulate and determined, number of courts con-
49. The buyer's 'reliance on the manufacturing seller's skill and the likelihood that he who
made a barge knew of its defects were the dominant considerations in Shepherd v. Pybus, 133
Eng. Rep. 1390 (C.P. 1842), even though the goods had been in existence and open to inspec-
tion at the time of sale. See also James Drummond & Sons v. E.H. Van Ingen & Co., 12 App.
Cas. 284 (1887); Jones v. Padgett, 24 Q.B.D. 650 (1890).
50. Sale of Goods Act, 1853, 56 & 57 Viet., c. 71, §§ 14 (1), 14 (2). The phrase was almost
certainly aimed at scuttling Justice Mellor's formulation of the obligation to deliver merchant-
able articles as a manufacturer's obligation: "[W]here a manufacturer undertakes to supply
goods manufactured by himself, or in which he deals .... it is an implied term in the contract
that he shall supply a merchantable article." Jones v. Just, L.R. 3 Q.B. 197, 203 (1868) (em-
phasis added). See also U.C.C. § 2-314.
51. Reynolds v. General Elec. Co., 141 F. 551, 554 (8th Cir. 1905).
A number of American cases adopted this position. See, e.g., Harrington v. Montgomery
Drug Co., 111 Mont. 564, 111 P.2d 808 (1941) (seller of product intended for intimate bodily
use not liable where buyer had equal opportunity of discovering defects); State ex rel. Jones
Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944) (buyer must bear risk of defects in
product quality); Barton v. Dowis, 315 Mo. 226, 285 S.W. 988 (1926) (seller of animals not
liable where knowledge of contracted disease was lacking); S. WILLISTON, SAT. S § 233, at 597
n.1 (rev. ed. 1948). See also Kirkland v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735
(1937); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 A. 186 (1925).
52. See Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L.
REv. 585 (1939); Waite, supra note 40; Waite, Retail Responsibility: A Reply, 23 MINN. L. REv.
612 (1939).
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tinued to hold the warranty sections inapplicable to retail sales on one or
another of these available pretexts. Typically, it was found that the offending
article had not been sold by description;53 sometimes relief was denied be-
cause the container, rather than the contents, was defective. 54 Not until the
1950's did it become generally acknowledged that the sale of an article
under a trade name did not render section 15 (1) inoperative, as the Act
seemed to suggest.55
Not all American courts insulated nonmanufacturing sellers from liability,
but in the early part of this century a clear majority did so,56 and a number
continued to do so until quite recently, despite a growing belief that the
Sales Act rendered a retail seller liable for latent defects
regardless of the limitations of fair inference from the particular
fact situation. That is to say, it imposes a liability as matter of law,
regardless of reasonable inference. This interpretation is difficult to
reconcile with judicial statements that the section merely codifies
the (American) common law. Nevertheless, worded as it is, without
any reference to the fact situation, it probably does purport to im-
pose an arbitrary liability quite regardless of any fairly inferential
intent of the seller, or reasonable expectation of the buyer.5 7
Thus, even as the tide of caveat emptor was running out for the non-
manufacturing seller, there remained a large pool of dealer immunity where
the defendant could prove that the defective merchandise had passed
through his hands in a sealed container.58 The helplessness of a retailer who
was obviously prevented from assuring himself of the quality of the mer-
chandise he was selling was strongly contrasted with the manifest oppor-
tunities of a manufacturing seller to know and control the quality of the
53. Phares v. Sandia Lumber Co., 62 N.M. 90, 305 P.2d 367 (1957) (self-service sale not
sale by description); Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash. 2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955) (sale
under trade name not sale by description); see Ruud, The Vendor's Responsibility for Quality in
the Automated Retail Sale, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 139 (1960). But see Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner
Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961).
54. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955) (doubt expressed concern-
ing extension of an implied warranty to a defective glass jar containing food).
55. Frantz Equipment Co. v. Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A.2d 702 (1952) (trade name
of automobile did not preclude existence of seller's implied warranty); Green Mountain Mush-
room Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953) (trade name of roofing cement did not
preclude existence of seller's implied warranty). See also Frigidinners, Inc. v. Branchtown Gun
Club, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 643, 109 A.2d 202 (1954).
56. See note 51 supra. See also J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF
SALES AND SALES FINANCING 76 (2d ed. 1962).
57. This rather inimical but perceptive analysis of the effect of the warranty provisions of
the Sales Act was made by Waite, supra note 40, at 507-08 (footnotes omitted; emphasis origi-
nal), who argued convincingly in favor of retaining retail immunity.
58. For a discussion of the "sealed container" exception, see Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner
Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961).
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goods he himself produced. 59 While no one would try to revive this attitude
today, it played an important role in shaping subsequent legal develop-
ments. Although the logic of this position acted as a brake on the develop-
ment of dealer responsibility in America, it served to concentrate judicial
attention on manufacturer's responsibility much more strongly in America
than in England. To this extent the sealed-container rule contributed to the
unique and remarkable developments in this field which were to generate a
flood of analysis, controversy, legislation, and litigation in the 1960's.
B. Sellers of Impure Food and Drink
Beginning in 1815, a series of dicta by the New York courts suggested
that there was an implied warranty of wholesomeness in the sale of provi-
sions for immediate consumption. The first of these, Van Bracklin v.
Fonda,60 rested upon the authority of Blackstone who had written that "[i]n
contracts for provisions, it is always implied that they are whole-
some."61 While there has been some debate about whether Blackstone's
statement correctly reflected the English law, 62 it is sufficient to note that
certain enactments making the supply of unwholesome food and drink a
criminal offense were extant when the learned jurist wrote,6 3 and that some
early judicial pronouncements 64 support his opinion.
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the food warranty did not pur-
port to reflect the presumed intention of the parties, but rested from the
outset on grounds of public policy. 65 Some courts preferred, however, to
say that a dealer was not in a position to tell whether the food was fit for
59. This is the basis of the argument in Waite, supra note 40.
60. 12 Johns. 468 (N.Y. 1815). This dictum was echoed in Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552
(1860), Moses v. Mead, I Denio 378, aff'd, 5 Denio 617 (N.Y. 1846), and Wright v. Hart, 17
Wend. 267, aff'd, 18 Wend. 449 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
61. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 166.
62. See J. MELICK, THE SALE OF FOOD AND DRINK 10 (1936). But see Perkins, Unwhole-
some Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IowA L. BULL. 6 (1919). Perkins concludes that the cases
do not justify the conclusion that this tendency resulted in the actual adoption of such a rule,
but he relies on a 19th century decision, Emmerton v. Mathews, 158 Eng. Rep. 604 (Ex. 1862),
which accurately reflects only the law of its own time. For a fuller historical discussion, see
Burnby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1847), where it was concluded that the obligation to
supply wholesome food attached to "common trades" such as vintners, brewers, butchers,
taverners, and cooks rather than being an incident of sale of food per se. Melick's view that
there was an implied warranty of wholesomeness in contracts for the sale of food and drink is
generally preferred. See The Assault, supra note 2, at 1104; Titus, Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 735-36 (1970).
63. Burnby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348, 1352 (Ex. 1847).
64. Roswel v. Vaughan, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ex. 1607) (an offense against the commonwealth
to sell corrupt food); see Burnby v. Bollett, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348, 1349 (Ex. 1847).
65. "In the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that they are
sound and wholesome, at his peril. This is a principle, not only salutary, but necessary to the
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consumption. In accordance with the logic of this rationale, these courts
refused to hold the seller of unwholesome food in sealed containers li-
able. 66 The majority of courts nevertheless upheld the liability of the retail
seller of food and drink intended for immediate consumption no matter how
it was packaged.6 7 Where, however, a dealer sold provisions to another
dealer for purposes of resale rather than consumption, this majority was
much less inclined to protect the buyer. The general rule in this situation
was caveat emptor.68 If the seller also happened to be the packer or pro-
cessor of the food, he would always be liable, even though he had only sold
to a dealer for resale and not for immediate consumption. 69
In sum, sellers of food have long been subject to exceptional liability
based on implied warranty. This liability was concentrated in a single
figure-the packer and processor of food-who was widely held accountable
for any unwholesome food which he might sell.70 When canners, packers, or
processors were subjected to this kind of liability, however, it often involved
the award of damages for economic loss to middlemen 7 rather than dam-
ages for personal injury to consumers. This is not surprising when one con-
siders that only people who were in privity of contract with a manufacturer
were permitted to sue him during the early years of the 20th century.
IV. THE SUPERIORITY OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
OVER STRICT TORT LIABILITY AS
A TOOL FOR LITIGATION
A. The Extension of Implied Warranty to Actions
Between Parties Lacking Privity of Contract
While the application of implied warranty in products liability cases was
not without support, some commentators were bitterly opposed to its exten-
preservation of health and life." Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468, 468-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1815). "The rule is an onerous one, but public policy as well as public health demand such
obligation should be imposed." Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 415, 118 N.E. 853, 854 (1918).
66. Scruggins v. Jones, 201 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Walden v. Wheeler, 153 Ky.
181, 154 S.W. 1088 (1913); Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. 646, 38 N.Y.S. 1052 (Sup. Ct.
1896).
67. Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Il. App. 117 (1913); Ward v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918); Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5
IowA L. BULL. 6, 22-23 (1919).
68. Ryder v. Nietge, 21 Minn. 70 (1874); Needham v. Dial, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 141, 23 S.W.
240 (1893).
69. "The sale of hams or bacon, which is the curing of pork in a particular manner, involves
... the same principles of law which are applicable to manufactured articles . Copas v.
Anglo-American Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541, 548, 41 N.W. 690, 692 (1889).
70. E.g., Nixa Canning Co. v. Lehman-Higginson Grocer Co., 70 Kan. 664, 79 P. 141
(1905) (implied warranty that goods are free from latent defects not discoverable upon ordinary
examination where seller is the manufacturer).
71. Sinclair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich. 60, 23 N.W. 459 (1885); Neiman v. Channellene Oil &
Mfg. Co., 112 Minn. 11, 127 N.W. 394 (1910).
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sion beyond privity of contract. These critics characterized implied warranty
as an awkward device 72 that obscured the "true" nature of a manufacturer's
liability for the injury caused by a defective product to an out-of-privity
buyer.
William Prosser in particular advocated the abandonment of the warranty
rationale in favor of strict liability in tort:
All this is pernicious and entirely unnecessary. No one doubts that,
unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort
and not in contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the
contract law of sales; and it is "only by some violent pounding and
twisting" that "warranty" can be made to serve the purpose at all.
Why talk of it? If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be
strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illusory con-
tract mask. 73
Prosser's ideas and methods of analysis permeate products liability
law.74 His influence as official reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Torts was immense. 75 Nevertheless, academic credentials and recognition
do not warrant blind adherence to those arguments opposed to the applica-
tion of implied warranty in products liability cases. The extension of implied
warranty to products liability was a logical and appropriate outcome of the
case-by-case development which had molded the characteristics of implied
warranty. 76
Pure tort liability was not the readily available, doctrinally obvious de-
vice for extending products liability beyond the confines of contractual priv-
ity that it may appear to modern eyes. Indeed, the first decision to break
the privity barrier and award an out-of-privity plaintiff recovery for injury
caused by a defective product was a case where liability was held to rest
upon the breach of an implied warranty. 77 This case, Mazetti v. Armour &
Co., 78 was decided three years before MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 79
72. See 2 F. HAu'En & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.33, at 1606 (1956).
73. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1134.
74. Both courts and commentators alike were influenced by Prosser's two major articles in
the products liability field and the methods of analysis therein (What Seller? What Plaintiffs?
What Damages? What Defenses?). The Fall, supra note 2; The Assault, supra note 2.
75. At least fifteen jurisdictions have now embraced the Restatement rule. Titus, supra note
62, at 714 n.8.
76. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L.
REv. 335, 357-58 (1924).
77. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
"[I]n the absence of an express warranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under
modem conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original packages, and that
such warranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate
channels of trade." Id. at 630, 135 P. at 636.
78. 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
79. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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broke through the defenses of the citadel of privity via liability for negli-
gence.
In Mazetti, Armour & Co. prepared and sealed a carton of cooked
tongue and sold it to the Seattle Grocery Company. Seattle sold it to Ma-
zetti, a restauranteur, who served it to one of his patrons. The carton
contained a "foul, filthy, nauseating, and poisonous substance" and the un-
fortunate patron "then and there became sick and nauseated, and did then
and there in the presence of other persons publicly expose and denounce
the service to him of such foul and poisonous food."8 0 Mazetti sued the
packer for loss of reputation, loss of business, and loss of profits for the
remainder of his lease of the restaurant. The Supreme Court of Washington
awarded damages to the restaurant owner despite the fact that he bought
the packaged food from a wholesaler who was the defendant's immediate
purchaser. 8 '
Mazetti demonstrates that the extension of liability for defective products
beyond privity of contract was consistent with the common law development
of implied warranty. Prior to Mazetti there had been a long line of decisions
holding sellers of impure food and drink liable to their immediate purchas-
ers,8 2 but never before had a purchaser of defective goods been permitted to
sue the maker of the goods in implied warranty over the head of a middle-
man. The adaptation of the warranties to this extracontractual role rapidly
found favor with the courts in the majority of states. The wholesaler of the
packaged food in Mazetti was very much akin to the nonmanufacturing seller
of goods sold in a sealed container. For this reason the Mazetti court may
have thought it improper to hold the wholesaler liable,8 3 and turned to the
defendant as the only other person available to compensate the plaintiff.
Like the rules of tort law, liability in implied warranty was widely be-
lieved to be imposed by law for reasons of policy rather than being the
product of an agreement by the parties. If it was illogical to restrict tort
liability for defective chattels to parties who had actually contracted with
each other (as the legal community came to believe in the second decade of
this century), then it was equally indefensible to confine the operation of the
warranties to these limits.
But this explanation merely indicates that neither negligence nor war-
ranty was clothed with any self-evident suitability as a vehicle for liability in
the Mazetti case. The special feature of the case which might explain the
choice of implied warranty by the plaintiff's attorney was the nature of the
damages sought: economic loss consequential upon the purchase of a defec-
tive chattel.
80. Id. at 622, 135 P. at 633-34.
81. Id. at 630, 135 A. at 636.
82. See text accompanying notes 65-71 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 40-59 supra.
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B. Implied Warranty and Economic Loss
Warranty theory in general, including implied warranty, has been
characterized as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract." 8 It is true that implied warranty has a number of different, if not
conflicting, characteristics. On some occasions, for example, an implied war-
ranty might display contractual qualities, being promissory in nature and
part of a bargained-for agreement. At other times, an implied warranty could
be interpreted as tortious in nature, exhibiting qualities of an obligation to
refrain from misrepresentation or a duty imposed for public policy reasons.
But behind the characterization of implied warranty as a freak hybrid there
is a view that legal analysis and decisions employing implied warranty will
lead to unneeded controversy, confuision, and error.85
The question specifically raised is this: Is implied warranty a concept
which "carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable complica-
tions"8 6 to be of value for resolving issues of compensation for injury sus-
tained from defective or unmerchantable products? This article's response to
the question is clearly negative. The varied character of implied warranty is
not legally undesirable. Its contractual and representational characteristics
afforded courts precisely those tools needed in such cases as Mazetti v. Ar-
mour & Co. 7 and others, 8 where issues of economic loss recovery were
confronted and ultimately resolved in favor of such recovery.
The law of tort has shown persistent aversion to this kind of claim. When
Mazetti was decided, damages for personal injury caused by defective chat-
tels could only be claimed in exceptional circumstances from an out-of-
privity manufacturer. Far from allowing a claim for economic loss in negli-
gence, it was to be many years before the liability for personal injury would
be extended even to property damage. If an action in negligence to recover
economic loss is an uncertain prospect today, it could not have commended
itself to the plaintiff's attorney as a particularly promising doctrinal vehicle
for that kind of claim in 1913. Implied warranty, on the other hand, had
originally evolved as a remedy for economic loss, although it was available
for all kinds of losses caused by defective products by that time. The ex-
tracontractual use of warranty was restricted to items of food and drink for
some 40 years after Mazetti, and the post-Mazetti cases all involved personal
84. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1126.
85. See id. at 1126, 1127-34.
86. Id. at 1133.
87. 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
88. Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc.,
137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805
(N.D. 1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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injury (the most common consequence of bad food and drink) until the new
extracontractual warranty liability was broadened to cover other defective
goods in the 1950's.
Still, opponents, led by William Prosser,8 9 have been successful in
stifling judicial use of implied warranty, and, in so doing, discouraging re-
covery of economic loss. Their success has primarily resulted from the
acceptance of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by a large
number of state courts.9 0 Section 402A was the Restatement provision,
drafted by Prosser, which sought to establish strict tort liability as the sole
rationale for products liability. The section made it possible for out-of-privity
buyers to hold manufacturers strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by a
defective product, but only for personal injuries and property dam-
age. 9 ' Implied warranty was scuttled and economic loss ignored.
This widespread judicial approval of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is not justified or defensible. Section 402A has often been
regarded as a bold innovation. In reality, the section was a rejection of im-
plied warranty and economic loss recovery founded upon faulty analysis and
questionable case authority. With respect to the adoption of strict tort liabil-
ity, the decisions cited in support of section 402A were in large part implied
warranty cases.9 2 It was not until after the section's initial draft, yet prior to
its acceptance, that such cases as Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 93
and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.94 provided support for the sec-
tion. But these decisions also curiously relied upon implied warranty prece-
dents.9 5
A similar problem plagued the absence of economic loss recovery in sec-
tion 402A-Prosser intimates that recovery could only be based on an exten-
sion of the "dangerous products" rule, but the cases indicate recovery based
on warranty. According to Prosser, "the real break to other products came in
1958 with Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.,9 6
89. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1127.
90. For a breakdown of the various jurisdictions, see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28.33, at 1606 (1956).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
92. Id. § 402A app., at 4 (1966).
93. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). After Prosser had drafted the
tentative version of section 402A in 1964, but before the American Law Institute had accepted
it, Justice Traynor (who served as one of the advisers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts)
provided support for the section in the majority opinion he wrote in Greenman.
94. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
95. Herbert Titus conducted an extremely thorough examination of both the broad historical
arguments as well as all judicial decisions and legislative pronouncements that might conceiv-
ably have provided support for Greenman. He found that overall the case law was "inconclusive
and unhelpful" and that warranty cases had been cited. Titus, supra note 62, at 775, 780.
96. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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where the Michigan court found a warranty, without privity and without
negligence, of cinder building blocks when the user's home collapsed." 97
Prosser misread the Spence case. The structure in issue was not the
user's home; it did not collapse. What really happened in Spence was that
the defendant had sold to one C, who resold to the plaintiff, certain cinder
blocks which were used to construct a cottage in a lakeside resort area. The
blocks "started to crack, chip and, also, to pit and explode into a popping
series of minute craters, followed by numerous flakings and powdery depos-
its and exuding unsightly travelling red and yellow stains known as 'bleed-
ing'."9' There was expert testimony that these cracks were internal and
progressive and would "at some undefined future time probably endanger
the structure." 99 Defendant denied that such a risk existed, but this was of
no avail:
[E]ven granting the correctness of defendant's position (and disre-
garding the fact that the widowed plaintiff here appears to make at
least part of her living in that great American competitive
sweepstakes: the care and housing of migrant tourists) we do not
hesitate to hold . . . that in these circumstances and in this day
and age appearance as well as structural safety and durability is an
important factor in determining the merchantable quality and fit-
ness of these particular products as used in this case.100
Prosser's misconception of the new developments was not restricted to
the facts of the Spence case: in the Assault on the Citadel he wrote that
"[t]he last two years have brought no less than seven spectacular decisions,
97. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 654 (4th ed. 1971). Did
Prosser see Spence as a personal injury case? I do not know. In The Assault, supra note 2, at
1112, he wrote: "The first of these [non-food cases], Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., came, appropriately enough from the point of view of the defendant,
from the pen of Justice Voelker of Michigan, the author of Anatomy of a Murder . (foot-
note omitted).
98. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 122, 90
N.W.2d 873, 874 (1958).
99. Id. at 126, 90 N.W.2d at 876.
100. Id.
Prosser's misconception of the facts in Spence is worth noting because his judgment that the
court's remand was for property damages, "supported only in principle" by cases of economic
loss, might have been supported by his erroneous belief that the cottage had collapsed. The
Assault, supra note 2, at 1143 & n.264.
From the face of the opinion, it is easy to understand how Prosser may have taken the
position he did. Although the Spence court explicitly stated that the plaintiff's loss was primarily
due to the despoiled appearance of the cinder blocks rather than to property damage or to
personal injury, the court obscured and complicated the importance of this distinction by an
equivocal statement that the plaintiff's remedy under warranty might be grounded in negli-
gence.
The Michigan Court of Appeals subsequently acknowledged this confusing conclusion by the
Spence court, but after accurately reconstructing the facts in Spence, the appeals court com-
manded an interpretation of the remand contrary to Prosser's. Where a golf course owner
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which appear to have thrown the limitation to food into the ash pile, and to
hold that the seller of any product who sells it in a condition dangerous for
use is strictly liable to its ultimate user for injuries resulting from such
use." 101 One needs only a cursory glance at the seven decisions which Pros-
ser quotes in support of his formulation of the new rule to satisfy oneself
that only three of them were concerned with personal injury.10 2 Of the
others, three,103 and possibly four, 1 4 were awards for economic loss. This
early formulation of strict liability for injury caused by defective products in
a dangerous condition is, moreover, clearly the precursor of the current ver-
sion of section 402A of the Restatement which Prosser laid before the Ameri-
can Law Institute in 1964.
Section 402A was drafted to reflect what its creator called "the most
rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts." 105 It was to preserve and reinforce the gains
made in the warranty cases by removing them from the "intricacies of the
law of sales." But section 402A is not what it seems. It unblushingly cites
Spence and Continental Copper & Steel Industries v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius,
Inc.106 as illustrations 10 7 of a rule under which these cases could never have
reached court, since neither involved personal injury or physical damage to
chattels.
After Prosser had drafted the 1964 version, but before the ALI had ac-
cepted it, Justice Traynor, who served as one of the advisors to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, provided support for the new strict liability in tort
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.108 which was approved shortly
afterwards in New York. 10 9
sought to recover economic loss under implied warranty without privity from the manufacturer
of defective golf carts, the appeals court placed great emphasis on the fact that the loss in
Spence was "entirely economic" and that the Michigan Supreme Court, in Spence, had there-
fore "allowed recovery for economic loss." Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App.
602, 605, 618, 182 N.W.2d 800, 802, 809 (1970) (emphasis added).
101. The Assault, supra note 2, at 1112.
102. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Peterson v. Lamb
Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp.
31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
103. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
104. The fourth case is Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 156 A.2d 568
(1959), in which accidental damage to the product itself, which is sometimes held to be eco-
nomic loss, was recoverable.
105. W. PROSSER, supra note 97, § 97, at 654.
106. 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
107. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 14, at 4 (1966).
108. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
109. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436-37, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1963).
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On the assumption that "Greenman is likely to be not only authoritative,
but also the most articulate and persuasive argument in the literature in
favor of section 402A," Herbert Titus conducted an extremely thorough
examination of both the broad historical arguments and all decisions and
legislation which might conceivably have provided support for the case (and
so, less directly, for section 402A).110 He found that the case law was "in-
conclusive and unhelpful," 11 and that "the legislative history of warranty
liability argues that Greenman overrides the legislative will." 112 His objec-
tion to Greenman did not, however, involve a denial of the court's creative
function:
Although the court might possibly have developed a strict tort lia-
bility rule outside the Sales Act without case support, the Califor-
nia court did not do so and instead incorrectly cited warranty
cases. This misuse of case authority represents an overextension of
judicial policymaking power that conflicts with the guidelines for
judicial law reform stated by Justice Traynor himself.11 3
A number of commentators have pointed out that section 402A is incon-
sistent with the warranty provisions of the UCC,114 and that the almost uni-
versal legislative adoption of the UCC 115 has ended any freedom which a
particular court may have had to adopt the rule expressed in section
402A.116 Little can be added to the excellent studies which have been made of
the conflict between the UCC and the Restatement.1 1 7  The judicial develop-
ment of implied warranty took place independently of the UCC (and of the
Uniform Sales Act) for the most part. The attack on vertical privity of im-
plied warranty which began in 1913 and intensified in the late 1950's re-
ceived no more than a tenuous sanction from the UCC in the 1960's to the
extent that the UCC bestowed a belated and indirect recognition upon judi-
cial lawmaking beyond its own privity provisions. Also, there is a conflict
between the implied warranty cases and the UCC on the subject of dis-
110. Titus, supra note 62, at 713.
111. Id. at 775.
112. Id. at 781.
113. Id. at 780.
114. Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform
Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTrERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict
Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Juris-
prudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965).
115. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted all articles of the UCC.
116. Franklin, supra note 22, at 1016; Titus, supra note 62, at 751.
117. Rapson, supra note 114; Shanker, supra note 114; Speidel, Products Liability, Economic
Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1973); Titus, supra note 62.
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claimers which illustrates a divergence between contemporary legislative and
judicial attitudes toward implied warranty.
However well-founded the various objections to the Restatement formula-
tion may be, the courts of a large number of the states have approved
it.118 Not unexpectedly, this appears to have had a negative effect on the
development of liability for economic loss between parties not in priv-
ity.119 This statement must be qualified by mentioning that Justice Francis
allowed a claim for pure economic loss in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
I. 120 on the theory of strict liability in tort. However, it is significant that
he based this characterization entirely on Greenman. Quite understandably
there is no mention in Santor of section 402A with its unambiguous refer-
ence to "liability for physical harm . . . to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property." 121 Following the New Jersey Supreme Court's own unique
formulation in Santor, one court has now equated strict liability in tort with
breach of implied warranty in a more recent award of economic
loss. 122 Other courts which have permitted the recovery of economic loss
continue to say that the liability arises out of breach of implied warranty. 123
V. SHOULD ECONOMIC LOSS BE RECOVERABLE
OUTSIDE OF CONTRACTUAL PIrVITY?
Up to this point this article has been concerned with "is" rather than
"ought" questions. Economic loss awards have played a more important role
in the development of strict products liability than is generally acknowl-
118. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 1606 (1956).
119. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1970) (strict liability not applicable to recovery of consequential damage resulting from a defec-
tive turbine generator); State ex rel. Western Seed Prod. v. Campbell, 250 Ore. 262, 442 P.2d
215 (1968) (buyer's desire to enjoy the profit of his bargain not an interest which tort law has
traditionally been called upon to protect); Thermal Supply v. Assel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971) (strict liability in tort does not apply to pure economic loss-sales law is applicable
to this field and privity is therefore a requirement); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 455
S.W.2d 825 ('rex. Civ. App. 1970) (in the absence of proof that defects in a trailer caused
physical harm to the trailer, as opposed to economic loss to its purchaser, strict liability in tort
not applicable); see G.W. Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1972).
120. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
121. Not only does the Santor court fail to deal with section 402A, but neither does it men-
tion the UCC-not even in its discussion of implied warranty. The court seems to deal with the
inconsistency between the two formulations by avoiding it. See text accompanying note 114
supra.
122. Fashion Novelty v. Cocker Mach. Co., 331 F.Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1971).
123. See Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Ford Motor Co. v.
Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 I11. App. 2d 362,
219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Lang v. General Motors, Inc., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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edged, 124 but are these awards in fact justified? In considering the theoreti-
cal and policy arguments for and against liability for economic loss it may be
well to remind oneself that this kind of liability has been firmly established
between parties in privity of contract in all common law jurisdictions for
some time, and that the present debate concerns only the unresolved ques-
tion of liability for economic loss outside privity of contract.
A. Theoretical Support for
Economic Loss Recovery
Analysis aimed at answering the question whether economic loss ought to
be recoverable in products liability cases outside privity of contract has usu-
ally begun with the premise that tort law has traditionally disregarded the
infringement of economic interests by others unless the interference was
intentional. The familiar analysis next notes that contract law has long af-
forded extensive protection to economic interests. In the same breath,
notice is taken of the fact that a buyer lacking privity of contract with the
manufacturer of a defective product could not possibly bring a suit in con-
tract against that manufacturer for injuries sustained from the product. On
the contrary, such a buyer's effort to obtain compensation from the manufac-
turer, it is said, must be classified as fundamentally an action in tort. The
conclusion drawn is that the tortious nature of the buyer's cause of action
makes it necessary for the court to disallow recovery of the buyer's economic
loss because of the traditional judicial reluctance to protect economic in-
terests in tort cases.1 25
124. See Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 L.Q. REv. 248 (1967); Bennett, Pro-
ducts Liability: Tortious Recovery for Economic Loss, 7 Vic'r. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 330
(1973-1975); Brown, The Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort, 2 AucKLAND U.L. REv. 50 (1972);
Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence: The Search for a Just Solution, 50 CAN. B.J. 580
(1972); Stoljar, The International Harvester Case: A Manufacturer's Liability for Defective
Chattels, 32 AusTL. L.J. 307 (1959); Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22; Note,
Products Liability: What Type of Loss Will the Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort Cover?, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 385 (1965); Note, Products Liability-Wholesaler-Economic Loss, 19 MAINE L.
REv 92 (1967); Note, Privity Eliminated as a Requirement in Loss-of-Bargain Products Liability
Cases-The Effects of Santor, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 715 (1965); Comment, The Vexing Problem
of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON
HALL L. REv. 145 (1972); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic
Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966); 19 VAND. L. REV. 214
(1965).
125. There are several references in the legal literature on this subject to the general tort
principle that nonintentional interference with economic interests is not actionable. E.g., Pros-
ser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 231, 232 (1966); Note, Negligent
Interference With Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REv. 664, 664,
667 (1964). But see Carpenter, Interference With Contract Relations, 41 HAIv. L. REv. 728,
739-41 (1928).
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This approach to the question falls victim to the very evil it strives to
avoid: it reasons by means of "outcome-affective" terms 126 instead of under-
lying realities. The effort to abandon such terms as "warranty" and "privity"
necessitates the use of even more loosely defined terms like "tort" and "con-
tract," which carry the analysis further from the underlying realities of fact
and policy. 1 2 7
There exists, however, a long and continued history of judicial recogni-
tion of recovery for economic loss128 in both actions for deceit in tort and
actions for breach of contract. 129 In each of these situations the plaintiffs
reliance upon a misrepresentation serves as the theoretical basis of judicial
relief for economic loss.'3 0 This same representational theory of recovery for
economic loss may be applied in products liability cases.
1. Deceit
Deceit, or fraud as it is sometimes called, is the typical tort action for
intentional misrepresentation.'13 In order for a plaintiff claiming deceit to
meet his burden of proof, specific facts showing either actual knowledge of
the representation's falsity, a conscious lack of belief in its truth, or a reck-
less disregard for its truth or falsity-the common "scienter" formula-must
126. This phrase is explained in Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 943.
127. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373,
419 (1937). Terms such as "tort" and "contract" may be outcome-affective. See Products Liabil-
ity Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 917. It has been argued, for example, that protection of
economic interests is justified in contract law, unlike in tort law, because the defendant in a
contract case has voluntarily undertaken a duty by choosing to contract with the plaintiff. Id. at
947. Such a statement passes superficial scrutiny because "contract" is a loosely defined word
that may be taken to mean a number of things. Upon closer examination, however, it is doubt-
fil that economic interests are protected in contract and not in tort because contractual duties
are primarily consensual in nature. On the contrary, the underlying reason for contract law's
protection of economic interests appears to be the commercial and economic contexts within
which contractual obligations so often arise. Contractual obligations drawn on noncommercial
backgrounds illustrate that not every plaintiff bringing an action on a contract is necessarily
entitled to recovery of economic loss. See 46 YALE L.J., supra, at 396-98.
128. See Fuller & Perfue, supra note 127 (pts. 1-2), at 52-54, 406-10; Products Liability
Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 945-46; 16 VAND. L. REv. 266, 266-67 (1962).
129. It is conceded that courts are frequently justified in refusing recovery for economic loss
in many tort cases. See, e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d
200 (Ct. App. 1946). But cases like Stevenson and tort cases involving misrepresentation are
distinguishable. Professor Carpenter noted the distinction between these types of cases which
may help to explain why economic loss is readily recoverable in the latter and not the former.
Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L.
REv. 749, 756-59 (1930).
130. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109,
1154 (1974).
131. NV. PROSSEn, supra note 97, § 105, at 686; Prosser, supra note 125, at 233.
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be established.' 32 A number of courts also premise liability on negligent and
innocent misrepresentation. 133
There are two ways to measure relief for deceit claims. The majority of
American jurisdictions measure damages according to the "benefit-of-the-
bargain" rule, 134 which provides that a deserving plaintiff receive the differ-
ence between the value actually accruing to him in a particular situation and
the value which would have accrued to him had the defendant's representa-
tion been true. 135 For example, a buyer of realty who justifiably relies upon
a broker's intentional misrepresentation concerning the dimensions of a par-
cel of land would be entitled to recover from the broker the difference be-
tween the land's value based on its actual size, and its value had the parcel's
dimensions been as the broker stated.
A minority of American courts measure deceit damages by the "out-of-
pocket-loss" rule. 136 This rule provides that a plaintiff injured by deceit is
entitled only to the difference between the value he parted with due to a
defendant's misrepresentation and the value he actually received. 137 Apply-
ing this out-of-pocket-loss rule to the above example of the real estate
purchase, the defrauded buyer could only recover from the broker the dif-
ference between the purchase price of the land and the actual value of the
land determined according to its true size.
132. The "scienter" formula was initially laid down in the case of Derry v. Peek, 14 App.
Cas. 337 (1889), and has been adopted by the majority of courts and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. Shapo, supra note 130, at 1157.
133. The negligent misrepresentation cases include: Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299
F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931); Suit v. Scan-
drett, 119 Mont. 570, 178 P.2d 405 (1947); Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 13. A. 141 (1925);
International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927); Brown v. Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958).
The innocent misrepresentation cases include: Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (1949); Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. J.D. Pittman Tractor Co., 244 Ala. 354, 13 So. 2d 669 (1943); Gulf Elec. Co. v.
Fried, 218 Ala. 684, 119 So. 685 (1928); Becker v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 P. 496 (1920);
Irwin v. Carlton, 369 Mich. 92, 119 N.W.2d 617 (1963); Essenburg v. Russell, 346 Mich. 319,
78 N.W.2d 136 (1956); Moulton v. Norten, 184 Minn. 343, 238 N.W. 686 (1931); Helvetia
Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., 137 Minn. 321, 163 N.W. 665 (1917); B-W Acceptance Corp. v.
Benjamin T. Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 99 S.E.2d 606 (1957); Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw Gas
Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 P. 984 (1926); Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 P.
637 (1925); Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va. 410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922).
134. Bragdon v. Chase, 149 Me. 146, 99 A.2d 308 (1953); Anderson v. Tri-State Home Im-
provement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 67 N.W.2d 853 (1955); McCormick, Damages in Actions for
Fraud and Deceit, 28 ILL. L. REv. 1050, 1051-53 & n.18 (1934); Note, Measure of Damages
for Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. REv. 1209, 1210-12 (1961).
135. McCormick, supra note 134, at 1052--53.
136. Addy v. Stewart, 69 Idaho 357, 207 P.2d 498 (1949); Tysk v. Griggs, 253 Minn. 86, 91
N.W.2d 127 (1958); Fortuna v. Conkling, 5 App. Div. 2d 1048, 173 N.Y.S. 2d 827 (1958); Note,
Measure of Damages for Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. REv. 1209, 1212-13 (1961); Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 875 (1967).
137. McCormick, supra note 134, at 1051-52.
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In addition to out-of-pocket-loss damages and benefit-of-the-bargain
damages-which are in reality alternative measures for direct harm-many
courts have allowed compensation for consequential injury stemming from a
misrepresentation.1 3 Within the context of the real estate purchase de-
scribed above, consequential injury would include a loss of profits caused by
the buyer's inability to construct commercial facilities on the parcel or ex-
penditures incurred in drafting new architectural plans in accordance with
the actual size of the parcel.
Commentators have disagreed as to whether the benefit-of-the-bargain
rule or the out-of-pocket-loss rule is the proper measure of damages for a
cause of action in deceit. Tort law calls for an out-of-pocket-loss measure, 139
while contract principles are said to dictate a benefit-of-the-bargain remedy
for a plaintiff alleging a cause of action in deceit.' 40 However, these ap-
proaches to understanding the nature of deceit ignore important underlying
considerations of fact and policy.
Court-awarded relief for deceit is essentially compensation for some
commercial, financial, or other economic loss caused by a misrepresenta-
tion. 14 1 A person relying upon a false representation may have bestowed
some benefit upon the misrepresenting party, or a third party, or may have
otherwise detrimentally changed position as a result of reliance upon the
false represention. 142 The policy of compensating economic losses resulting
from a detrimental change of position ijn reliance upon a misrepresentation is
the underlying justification for out-of-pocket-loss damages. 43 A purchaser of
realty who is deceived so as to believe that there have been recent oil dis-
coveries on an otherwise worthless tract of land has suffered a reliance loss
amounting to the entire purchase price of the tract, an amount equal to the
seller's unjust enrichment. Aside from the purchase price, the purchaser in
this instance has suffered other reliance losses, one being his title search
expenses. These additional losses coming out of the purchaser's pocket, but
not necessarily benefiting the seller, should be recoverable since they flow
from the seller's deceit. Courts and commentators have also noted that the
satisfaction of reasonable expectations is important for encouraging commer-
cial activity. 144 Benefit-of-the-bargain damages could be founded upon this
138. Id. at 1059-61.
139. See, e.g., id. at 1051.
140. See, e.g., Note, Measure of Damages for Fraud and Deceit, 47 VA. L. REv. 1209,
1210-11 (1961).
141. Boblen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 H~Av. L. REv. 733,
733-34 (1929).
142. Compare Fuller & Perdue, supra note 127, at 409-10 with 53-54.
143. See McCormick, supra note 134, at 1051-53.
144. Compare Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MiNN.
L. REv. 939, 941 (1938).with Shapo, supra note 130, at 1166.
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policy of allowing recovery for the expected fruits of an unrealized represen-
tation. Consider for example, the real estate purchaser described above who
justifiably relies upon the seller's false remarks about rich oil reserves. This
purchaser might be able to show that the benefit of his bargain was the
value he reasonably expected the land to possess had there actually been oil
below its surface. Consequential injury in the form of lost profits might also
be within the range of benefit-of-the-bargain damages.
The policies of granting restitution, of compensating reliance losses, and
of satisfying reasonable expectations arising from a misrepresentation justify
deceit as a claim for relief,'4 5 and apparently some courts have begun
analyzing claims of deceit to promote these specific policies instead of apply-
ing an inflexible rule of damages. 146 Analysis revolving about these policy
interests also indicates when and if there ought to be recovery for negligent
and innocent misrepresentations.
A number of factors have been used to limit liability for misrepresenta-
tion. One limit is that a plaintiff's reliance upon a misrepresentation must be
justifiable. Courts have also fashioned a second, less flexible limit to misrep-
resentational liability: liability is imposed only when the misrepresentation's
reliance-inducing qualities were intended, known, or specially foreseeable
by a defendant. Courts have been more reluctant to impose liability when
the reliance-inducing tendency of a false representation was only generally
foreseeable to a defendant or not foreseeable at all.147
At one end of this liability spectrum is Glanzer v. Shepard. 14 8 In
Glanzer, the plaintiff had relied upon a weighing certificate, issued by the
defendant to determine the price of certain goods purchased by the plaintiff
from a third-party seller, which was negligently prepared, causing the plain-
tiff to overpay for the goods. The tendency of the weighing certificate to
induce reliance upon a particular monetary amount as the proper purchase
price was probably intended by the defendant and certainly known to him.
Jaillet v. Cashman 14 9 exemplifies a situation at the other end of the
spectrum in which a court refused to impose liability when the reliance-
inducing tendency of the misrepresentation was only generally foreseeable to
the defendant. In this case the defendant had negligently misreported a cer-
tain event over a stock-ticker newstape that was influential to investor opin-
ion. After receiving the report, the plaintiff sold stock on the basis of this
report by the defendant. Although the defendant had clearly been negligent,
145. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 127, at 409-10.
146. See Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70,
104 A.2d 54 (1954); Selman v. Shirley, 161 Ore. 582, 85 P.2d 384 (1938), aff'd on rehearing,
161 Ore. 613, 91 P.2d 312 (1939); Salter v. Heiser, 39 Wash. 2d 826, 239 P.2d 327 (1951).
147. See cases cited note 133 supra.
148. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
149. 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
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the court did not impose liability for misrepresentation. It was crucial to the
court's decision that the reliance-inducing tendency of the false news report
was only generally foreseeable to the defendant.
2. Breach of Contract
Tort actions for misrepresentation are not the only occasions for recovery
of economic loss. Courts deciding contract actions have long allowed such
recovery,150 also under a representional theory. An offer to enter a contract
with another person might be thought of as a representation-a representa-
tion of an undertaking. Offers that embody promises of future performance
carry a reliance-inducing tendency. Should an offeree exercise his power of
acceptance and believe that he has entered a contract, actual reliance upon
the offeror's representation will have been displayed. Saying that an offeree
gave consideration for a promise he relied upon simply recognizes the of-
feree's reliance as justifiable.
That representational theory is the theoretical basis of contractual liability
seems to be a plausible proposition. Such a suggestion is hardly legal heresy.
After all, deceit and assumpsit, the forerunners of modem contract and tor-
tious misrepresentation claims, shared company within the action on the
case for a considerable period of time. 151 Admittedly, there are differences
between actions for breach of contract and actions for tortious misrepresen-
tations. A misrepresentation of fact, for example, is false when it is made,
while a misrepresentation of an undertaking is false only after performance
has been breached; justifiable reliance in breach of contract actions is con-
sensually oriented while this is not true for tortious misrepresentations.
Nevertheless, the visible similarities between these actions for economic loss
cannot be easily ignored.
In addition to the common thread of representational theory, a further
similarity exits between actions for breach of contract and actions for misrep-
resentation. In the analysis of tortious misrepresentation, economic loss re-
covery was observed to rest upon three different but related policies: restitu-
tion of conveyed benefits, compensation for reliance losses, and satisfaction
of expected gains.1 52 A judicial concern for these same three policies jus-
tifies recovery of economic loss in contract actions.
First, a promisee confers a benefit upon his promisor in the belief that
the promisor will perform as originally agreed. If it should happen that the
promisor fails to perform and thus breaches the agreement, the promisee
will have forfeited the value of those benefits conveyed under the contract.
150. Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 946-47.
151. See Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HAuv. L. REV. 1 (1888); Carpenter, supra note
129, at 760-61; Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 948.
152. See text accompanying notes 141-45 supra.
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In such a case, contract law affords the promisee an opportunity to obtain
restitution of those benefits conferred upon the promisor. Second, the prom-
isee in such a situation may have incurred various expenses in preparing to
perform his side of the bargain. Such costs of preparation would not neces-
sarily involve corresponding benefits conveyed to the promisor for which the
promisee could receive restitution. In contract actions courts have frequently
awarded compensation for these reliance losses of the promisee.153 Finally,
a promise may have led the promisee to expect some gains for himself when
the promisor ultimately performs his part of the bargain. The relief granted
upon a successful contract claim has usually sought to satisfy reasonable ex-
pectation gains, thus enforcing the contract as if it had been actually per-
formed.'15
4
3. Products Liability Cases
Carrying the analysis one step further, commentators' 55 have suggested
that representational theory may be used to prove a claim of economic loss
caused by a defective or unmerchantable product. For some courts and
commentators, representations relating to a product are thought to be made
only when express words are spoken or written statements made. 156 Others
have held that the making of a representation does not require express oral
or written communication, and they would recognize implied or implicit
representations in many products liability cases.' 57
For example, product representations may be inherent in a manufac-
turer's marketing of a product. 158 "By placing their goods upon the market,
the suppliers represent to the public that they are suitable and safe for
use .... ."59 In addition, it is said that the product itself 160 triggers an
impression within a buyer's mind of the general social consensus of its
character and function. 16 1 An automobile, for example, triggers impressions
153. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 127, at 53-54.
154. See A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1 (1952); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 127, at 53-54,
60-63.
155. Seavey, Actions for Economic Harm-A Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1242, 1242-43
(1957); Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 945-46.
156. E.g., Adkins v. Ford Motor Co., 446 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1971); Products Liability
Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 920-22 & nn.24-40, 945-46 & nn.214-19.
157. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965). See also Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 311 A.2d 140 (1973).
158. Shapo, supra note 130, at 1243-45.
159. The Fall, supra note 2, at 799; accord, The Assault, supra note 2, at 1122-23; Com-
ment, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in
Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 145, 153 (1972).
160. Shapo, supra note 130, at 1234.
161. Id. at 1240, 1370.
[Vol. 27:647
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of a motor vehicle with properly functioning brakes and transmission.
Likewise, a refrigerator raises presumptions of an appliance that will keep
food cold. The product itself, in short, is the message to the buyer.
As noted above, a certain degree of culpability on the part of the defen-
dant was required in tort actions for misrepresentation-intent, knowledge,
or special foreseeabiity-mere general foreseeability being the point at
which most courts refuse to impose liability. 162 Assuming the presence of
product representations, the requisite degree of culpability could also be
sucessfully proven in a products liability case. A manufacturer induces
buyers to purchase his product by fostering an image through advertising.
Often, a manufacturer knows facts making it specially foreseeable to him that
the representations emanating from his product will have a reliance-inducing
tendency.' 63 Thus, proof of culpability relating to a representation's
reliance-inducing tendency is not likely to be an insurmountable barrier for
buyers seeking relief Jn products liability actions.
Another important element of either a tort or contract claim for misrep-
resentation is actual and justifiable reliance. A buyer displays actual reliance
upon a product representation when that representation influences his deci-
sion to purchase. A buyer who relies upon a representation implied by the
product itself is in the same position as a person who relies to his detriment
upon an ordinary misrepresentation or breached promise. On the one hand,
the difference between the product's purchase price and its actual or market
value is the buyer's out-of-pocket loss (a reliance loss).164 On the other
hand, the difference between the product's represented value and its actual
value is the buyer's loss of the benefit of his bargain (an unrealized expecta-
tion gain).16 5 A buyer faces only normal difficulties of proof in satisfying this
element of a successful misrepresentation action in a products liability case.
Proving that one's reliance as a buyer upon a product representation was
justifiable so as to warrant recovery of economic loss, however, might be
more difficult in a products liability case. The element of justifiable reliance
in actions for tortious misrepresentation and breach of contract involves a
process of weighing and balancing various interests. By analogy, justifiable
162. See text accompanying notes 147-50 supra. See also Prosser, supra note 125.
163. See Shapo, supra note 130, at 1180 (objectively expectable impression made on the
consumer); id. at 1181 (reasonably understandable impression); id. at 1370 (the result objec-
tively determinable). As Dean Prosser noted:
The supplier, by placing the goods upon the market, represents to the public that
they are suitable and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising or otherwise, he
does everything that he can to induce that belief. He intends and expects that the
product will be purchased and used in reliance upon this assurance of safety; and it
is in fact so purchased and used.
The Assault, supra note 2, at 1122 (emphasis added).
164. See text accompanying notes 136-37, 142-43 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 134-35, 144 supra.
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reliance in products liability cases should entail the same balancing and
weighing process. 1 6r A buyer who purchases a product whose actual value is
far less than was its represented value is interested in obtaining restitution
for any discrepancy in value and for those gains he may have reasonably
expected in light of the product's representations. Aside from strictly
economic interests, the buyer also has an interest in his own health and
safety, which would be threatened by defective products. Refusal to com-
pensate a buyer for the costs of repairing such products could discourage
preventive repairs and thus increase the risk of harmful future acci-
dents.' 67 Society may also have an interest in seeing buyers recover the
economic loss caused by a defective or unmerchantable product. Buyers
often find it difficult' 68 and costly 169 to ascertain the truth about certain
representations of a product. Compensating them for economic losses that
could not be reasonably avoided would promote society's interest in a
healthy exchange and consumption of goods and services.
7 0
Manufacturers, on the other hand, want the freedom to represent their
products as they wish to promote sales,' 71 which complements the societal
interest in a healthy level of production and distribution of goods and ser-
vices. 1 2 Liability rules, if not properly shaped, will dampen business incen-
tive and harmfully affect the production of goods and services. 173
A familiar form of legal action for presenting theories in favor of
economic loss recovery is needed, however. Implied warranty appears to be
one such form of action. Because warranties have traditionally been looked
upon as express or implied representations, representational theory may eas-
ily underlie a products liability complaint that is structured in the form of an
implied warranty action. But whatever form of-action is chosen on whatever
166. See Shapo, supra note 130, at 1363-64; cf. Carpenter, Interference With Contract Rela-
tions, 41 HAxv. L. REv. 728, 745 (1928) (determining liability for an alleged incident of contrac-
tual interference involves a weighing of the conflicting interests between plaintiff and defend-
ant).
167. Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 197, 201-02 (1957).
168 Weisiger, Basis of Liability for Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REV. 866, 875 (1930);
Zanmit, supra note 22, at 84.
169. See Shapo, supra note 130, at 1372-73.
170. See id. at 1372-73, 1380-81.
171. See Note, Negligent Interference With Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16
STAN. L. REv. 664, 675-76 (1964).
172. See Shapo, supra note 130, at 1371-73.
173. See id. at 1371-73, 1380-81. Concern for society's infant productive capacity may well
have been the underlying rationale for the privity of contract requirement in products liability
cases that was set forth in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), and applied
in such later cases as Lebourdois v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907).
See W. PROSSER, supra note 97, § 96, at 641-42. Of course, with the more advanced technol-
ogy and increased productive capacity of the present day, manufacturers are less vulnerable to
the imposition of products liability.
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theoretical basis, the important consideration is that injured buyers be af-
forded some means of recovery for economic loss.
B. Common Arguments Against Economic Loss Recovery
Representational theory constitutes a theoretical basis for allowing recov-
ery of economic loss. Even without this theoretical underpinning, however,
sound policy considerations justify recovery of economic loss. These justifica-
tions will be addressed by analyzing the common arguments against such
recovery.
1. Direct Economic Loss
As defined previously, direct economic loss consists of the difference be-
tween the actual value of the defective goods and the value they would have
had if they had not been defective. 174 This hypothetical defect-free value is
often calculated by referring to the price which the plaintiff-buyer paid for
the goods. The use of this yardstick enabled Prosser to argue that out-of-
privity manufacturer's liability was dangerous, as the dealer could trigger it
by simply selling a product to the ultimate consumer at an unreasonably
high price:
Such pecuniary loss is a matter, not only of what the plaintiff has
received, but also of what he has paid for it. Loss on the bargain
must depend upon what the bargain is; and when the purchaser of
a new car trades in his old one to the dealer, whether he suffers
any pecuniary loss, and if so what is its extent, must necessarily
depend upon the allowance made by the dealer on the trade. It
must also be affected by the dealer's undertaking to the plaintiff,
and whatever representation or warranties he has made. If the
dealer overprices the goods, or if he sells grade 2 as grade 1, there
will be a loss on the bargain even if they are in no way defective,
and of course all the more if they are; but how much of the loss is
to be attributed to the manufacturer? This appears to be clearly, in
the first instance, a matter properly between the purchaser and the
dealer; and if the manufacturer is to be liable, it should be to the
dealer, and for damages which may be quite a different sum from
the dealer's own liability.175
There are several rejoinders to this argument. First, while a product's
retail price will often be an appropriate indicator of its represented value to
a buyer, a manufacturer could reduce or avoid his liability by proving that
the retailer charged an inflated price bearing no relation to the product's
174. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
175. The Fall, supra note 2, at 823.
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represented value. The same reasoning would apply to any additional or
expanded representations which a retailer might have made about a product.
Second, inflated prices and additional representations made by a retailer are
quantitatively insignificant. Manufacturers often exercise significant control
over retail prices and sales transactions, and even where they do not, prices
and the terms of written retail sales contracts' 76 are likely to be standard-
ized. Finally, no products liability attaches to anyone if the goods are not
defective, and price is only one of a number of factors that determine the
issue. 177
2. Consequential Economic Loss 1 78
Some courts 179 and commentators 180 have argued that economic loss,
especially consequential economic injury, is too speculative and excessive to
be a calculable or insurable'81 cost of the supplier's business. The conten-
tion is that even if a buyer proffers evidence of his consequential injury,
such evidence is at most conjectural, and a court would experience great
difficulty in measuring and apportioning any sort of damage award. 182
Unquestionably, consequential economic losses are potentially much
larger, and in this sense less predictable, than direct economic losses, but
this is hardly a sufficient reason for a denial of liability. The losses which
may be caused by personal injury and property damage are also unpredict-
able or "large" in relation to direct economic loss-they too can vastly ex-
ceed the value of the product which caused the trouble. The real question is
whether consequential economic losses can be said to be "larger" or in any
sense less predictable than personal injury or property damage. The issue of
manufacturer's liability is a justiciable one in sales law (between parties in
privity) and it has been for some considerable time.la Except where the
seller's liability has been the subject of agreement by the parties, it has been
the task of the courts to determine its scope, and it is doubtful that the
judicial limitations upon consequential economic loss evolved in these cases
176. It will be recalled, for instance, that the dealer in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32
N.J. 358, 16 A.2d 69 (1960), had no authority to vary a standard form sales contract supplied to
him by the manufacturer.
177. B.S. Brown & Sons v. Craiks Ltd., 1 All E.R. 823 (1970).
178. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
179. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 22-23 (1965).
180. See Note, Negligent Interference With Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16
STAN. L. REv. 664, 685-88 (1964).
181. Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 954-57.
182. See Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16
STAN. L. REv. 664, 685-88 (1964).
183. See Zammit, supra note 22, at 87.
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are likely to undergo great change if the litigation is between parties who
are not in privity.
What are the limitations on consequential economic loss claims? A blunt
characterization of the attitude of the courts toward this problem would be
that they are stingy to those whose only complaint is economic loss and
generous to those who suffer personal injury or property damage. To the
extent that the law of contract concerns itself with economic interests, leav-
ing personal injury and physical damage to the law of tort, it will use the
"stingy" measure, limiting its reach "to the amount of injury that would arise
generally, and in the great multitude of cases."'84 Where there is personal
injury or property damage, courts will adopt the generous measure more
characteristic of tort law, regardless of the fact that the parties might well be
in privity of contract.18 5 Conversely, they will continue to apply the "stingy"
rule to economic loss even where the parties are not in privity.186 There is
nothing mysterious about this distinction; it simply reflects the fact that we
regard dangerous products in a more serious light than worthless ones.
Generally speaking, all the sales legislation has directed that the loss to
be expected "in the great multitude of cases" is the difference between ac-
tual and warranted value-direct loss.&7 Recovery of consequential
economic loss thus requires "special circumstances," although the UCC does
not go as far as Hadley v. Baxendale 118 in requiring that the buyer actually
tell the seller of these; it is sufficient that he had reason to know of
them. 189 In practice this means that courts are not averse to compensating
the small expenses that are typically incurred in the insurance, inspection,
transportation, or storage of unmerchantable products,' 90 and, since there is
184. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854).
185. In Vacwell Engineering Co. v. B.D.H. Chemicals Ltd., 3 All E.R. 1681 (1969), a prod-
ucts liability case in which there was a contract between plaintiff and defendant, the court
concluded that "[a] minor explosion involving minor damage to property and to persons was
reasonably foreseeable. A violent explosion which killed one man and did 174,000 worth of
damage to a building was not." Id. at 1696. The judge nevertheless found for the plaintiff- "I am
unable to find that, because the damage to property was much greater than could have been
reasonably foreseeable, it was too remote to be recoverable in law." Id. at 1696. See also
U.C.C. § 2-715 (2) (b).
186. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
187. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-714 (2); UNiFORM SAES Ac § 69 (7) (act withdrawn 1951); Sale
of Goods Act, 1853, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 53.
188. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Hadley imposed the following limits upon damages for
breach of contract. For the most part, only those damages which arose generally from the
breach were recoverable. Damages resulting from the special circumstances of the plaintiff
would not be compensated unless the plaintiff had communicated those special circumstances to
the defendant. Id. at 151.
189. "The 'tacit agreement" test for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected."
U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 2.
190. See, e.g., Merco, Inc. v. Schranze, 21 Misc. 2d 743, 192 N.Y. S,2d 285 (1959), aff'd, 210
N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960).
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a strict requirement that the buyer mitigate his loss wherever possible, the
UCC allows him the expenses of doing so. 191 The stinginess of the rule
becomes apparent in relation to larger claims such as loss of anticipated prof-
it on resales, settlements made with dissatisfied subpurchasers, losses as-
sociated with the breakdown of profit-earning chattels, and loss of goodwill.
Faced with one of these claims (or, more typically, a combination of such
claims) courts will often find that the consequential loss is too speculative to
be the subject of an award, or that the special circumstances giving rise to
the buyer's loss were not in the supplier's contemplation.19 2 Even where
the plaintiff succeeds, the court's assessment of his loss is likely to be cau-
tious. 193
This article has suggested that the law regards a defect which makes a
product dangerous as a more important and urgent concern than one that
merely renders it worthless or unusable. To the extent that this means we
ought to regard personal injury as the most serious of all the undesirable
consequences attendant upon the supply of defective products, it is a ra-
tional priority. This priority does not, however, adequately explain all pre-
sently applicable liability rules. The high value given to the integrity of the
body only explains why there is out-of-privity liability for property damage
in those cases where the destructive chattel is also potentially dangerous to
life and limb. It does not explain the imposition of this kind of liability
where there is no such risk, 194 in the face of continuing out-of-privity im-
munity for economic loss even in cases where the risk does exist.' 95
Academic commentators generally regard themselves as being under a
duty to deal exhaustively with the arguments which have been put forward
on any question with which they find themselves occupied, but in this case
it would take a Joseph Heller to summon up the necessary gravity: ' 9 6
191. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1).
192. See, e.g., Neville Chemical v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3rd Cir. 1970);
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848, at 857 n.12 (1968); Burge Ice Mach. Co. v.
Strother, 197 Tenn. 391, 273 S.W.2d 479 (1954).
193. See Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); Isen-
berg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d 1016, modifted, 84 Ariz. 364, 329 P.2d 882 (1958); Scott
v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); and the following Canadian cases: Sunnyside
Greenhouses Ltd. v. Golden West Seeds Ltd., [1972] 4 W.W.R. 420 (Alta. Sup. Ct. App.
Div.), aff'd, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 288; Lakelse Dairy Prods. Ltd. v. General Dairy Mach. & Sup-
ply Ltd., 10 D.L.R.3d 277 (B.C. 1970); Freedhoff v. Pomalilt Indus., 3 Ont. 571 (1970); R.G.
McClean Ltd. v. Canadian Vickers Ltd., 15 D.L.R.3d 15 (Ont. Ct. App. 1970).
194. Where minks are, for example, killed by unsuitable feed.
195. Where we refuse, for example, to compensate the owner of a defective crane for lost
profits when he is forced to withdraw it from operations to repair a potentially lethal defect.
Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (Can. 1973).
196. See J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1st ed. 1961).
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Milo Minderbinder: It's senseless to bother manufacturers with
liability to the consumer for direct economic losses--the amounts
are just too small. 197
Yossarian: Well, what about consequential economic loss?
Minderbinder: Too big.'98
3. Disclaiming Liability for Economic Loss
The final argument against out-of-privity economic loss concerns dis-
claimers. In the United States the seller's right to disclaim liability for
economic loss is a well-established one. While the UCC says that a dis-
claimer of liability for loss caused by personal injury is prima facie uncon-
scionable,' 99 there is no presumption in regard to economic loss. The UCC
specifically provides, in fact, that a disclaimer of consequential economic loss
is not prima facie unconscionable. 200 What justification is there, then, for
depriving the seller of this right by making him liable to a plaintiff with
whom he has had no opportunity to bargain for a disclaimer? Lack of oppor-
tunity for a market transaction may, of course, affect the buyer's right to
bargain for an expansion of the rather limited liability for economic loss
placed on the seller by UCC sections 2-714 and 2-715 in exactly the same
way. But, recognizing that in the real world there are more disclaimers than
assumptions of liability, should we not simply admit that we are depriving
the supplier of something that his market power would otherwise have as-
sured him?
There is no need for a rule which denies that disclaimers have any effect
outside privity of contract. When a consumer has made a free and informed
choice to purchase, notwithstanding clear instructions accompanying the
product that draw his attention to specific limitations upon its performance
or durability, no supplier ought to be denied protection simply because he is
not in privity. The presence or absence of privity is so irrelevant to the real
question of whether or not there has been free consent that it should never
affect the validity of a disclaimer per se.20
Even if one accepts, however, that the power to disclaim may weaken or
disappear when there is no privity of contract, the very market power which
197. "The limited nature of liability for direct economic loss is itself an argument denying the
necessity or utility of a direct action against the manufacturer. Where damages are limited to
the price paid by the subpurchaser, his remedy against the retailer will, in most cases, prove
adequate." Products Liability Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 957.
198. Bennett, Products Liability: Tortious Recovery for Economic Loss, 7 Vicr. U. OF
VELLINGTON L. REv. 330, 345 (1975).
199. U.C.C. § 2-719 (3).
200. Id.
201. But see Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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makes it possible for a given supplier to disclaim will often enable him to
contract directly with consumers or other recipients of his products if he
should consider this in his interest. It is, after all, the immunity which man-
ufacturers continue to enjoy toward plaintiffs who are not in privity of con-
tract with them that has hitherto made it expedient for them to avoid
characterizing their distributors who might link them contractually to the
consumers of their products as agents. 20 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Blanket immunity for loss caused by "merely" worthless or unworkable
products (economic loss) which is still maintained in most jurisdictions when
there is no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant should be
abandoned. Although this change in the law will produce no more than a
modest increase in suppliers' liability, there is some justification for viewing
any proposal to increase liability as an expression of distrust for technology
and perhaps for the industrial system itself. However, the fine and worth-
while products which we produce demand a rational system of products
liability as strongly as the defective ones. The common law itself is a
uniquely useful precision instrument for achieving this rationality,2 0 3 as it
has proven by producing a remedy like warranty which borrows freely from
the law of tort and contract to deal with all the different kinds of loss which
may be caused by defective products.
202. The Ford Motor Company recently gave a convincing demonstration that this traditional
arrangement does not represent the natural order of things when it tried unsuccessfully to
persuade the District Court of Appeals of Florida that it was in privity of contract with a
consumer plaintiff in an economic loss suit in order to render a disclaimer clause (which com-
plied with all the formal requirements of section 2-316) operative against him. Ford might well
have succeeded if its contracts had not been carefully drafted in the traditional manner to avoid
this conclusion. Id. at 249.
203. Precision instruments are designed to achieve an idea, dimensional precision, whose
perfection is impossible. There is no perfectly shaped part of the motorcycle and never
will be, but when you come as close as those instruments take you, remarkable things
happen, and you go flying across the countryside under a power that would be called
magic if it were not so completely rational in every way. It's the understanding of this
rational intellectual idea that's fundamental. John looks at the motorcycle and he sees
steel in various shapes and has negative feelings about these steel shapes and turns off
the whole thing. I look at the shapes of the steel now and I see ideas. He thinks I am
working on parts. I'm working on concepts.
R. PInSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MoToRcYcLE MAINTENANcE 100 (1974).
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